Petitioner purported to appeal from the judgment of respondent Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which granted the state's petition for writ of mandate directing the municipal court to vacate its order that recused the District Attorney of Los Angeles County (California) as the prosecutor in an underlying case in which petitioner was charged with unlawful disposal of hazardous waste, under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25189.5.

Petitioner, an employee of the City of Whittier (California), was charged with unlawful disposal of hazardous waste, under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25189.5. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify the District Attorney's Office of Los Angeles County (California), on the ground of a conflict of interest because the district attorney's office discussed the allegations with petitioner but never advised him that he was the subject of a criminal investigation. The corporate restructuring attorney granted the motion. However, respondent Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) granted the state's petition for writ of mandate to reinstate the district attorney's office. Although the judgment was not appealable, under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 904.1, the court treated the purported appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, as it presented a question of public importance. The court issued a writ of mandate, holding that respondent abused its discretion, as there was ample evidence, for purposes of Cal. Penal Code § 1424, that the district attorney's office apparently or actually abused its relationship with the City of Whittier (California) to further its investigation.

The court issued a writ of mandate directing respondent superior court to vacate its judgment that vacated the recusal of the District Attorney's Office of Los Angeles County (California) from petitioner's case for unlawful disposal of hazardous waste because there was ample evidence of the appearance of or actual abuse by the district attorney's office of its relationship with the City of Whittier (California) to further its investigation.

Appellant client challenged a judgment from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which confirmed an arbitration award that found respondents, an attorney and a law firm, were entitled to attorney fees after the arbitrator ordered that the parties take nothing on their respective claims for professional negligence and unpaid fees and costs. The trial court awarded attorney fees incurred in connection with the petition to confirm.

The parties chose a retired judge as the arbitrator. The arbitrator's disclosure statement did not state that he was on a bar association committee with one witness; that he was on another association's board with a different witness and had participated on seminar panels with that witness; that attorneys from the law firm had appeared before him when he was a judge; or that a firm where he was of counsel had represented lawyers in malpractice actions. The court concluded that the arbitrator's business relationships and professional history did not require additional disclosures under Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.9, subds. (a)-(b), because the undisclosed matters were not substantial enough to create an impression of possible bias. Thus, there was no basis for disqualification under Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.91, and the trial court was not required to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(6)(A). The trial court properly awarded reasonable attorney fees under Civ. Code, § 1717, based on the reasonable rates in the local community and counsel's time records and billing statements. Proof of the precise amount counsel had been paid was not necessary.

The court affirmed the judgment.